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Relying on a model of economic geography, this paper discusses development opportunities 
arising from international trade and technology diffusion. We show that either import substitution 
or trade liberalization may trigger takeoff in the developing country, although these two policies 
work through different mechanisms. The industrialization process is also influenced by 
knowledge spillovers: strong international technology diffusion offers better prospects for the 
developing country to benefit from technological externalities provided abroad. Thus, one 
objective of the developing country should be to enhance its absorptive capacity in order to 
exploit these technological externalities. In this context, only import substitution trade policy 
seems to be successful in financing indigenous learning process. However, this result is strongly 





In the debate on development, much attention has been given to the role that 
international trade plays in explaining long term growth. The successful experiences of the 
East Asian countries have notably given credence to the belief in a positive relationship 
between outward orientation and economic development, but without establishing the 
direction of its causality (Bardhan (1995)). The fast development of the Newly Industrialized 
Countries (NICs) of East Asia, together with the failure of import substitution in Latin 
American countries, appeared to show that openness produced unambiguously superior 
economic performance to its counterpart. Much of the developing world then embarked on 
trade and industrial policy reforms, and yet failed to exhibit similar growth rates. 
A new literature focusing on country studies of South Korea and Taiwan has gained 
strength and questioned this outward-oriented approach (Amsden (1989), Wade  (1990)). 
Strong evidence is given that both countries pursued import substitution policies that had 
significant distorting effects, but still maintained remarkable rates of growth of exports, GDP 
and employment. This alternative approach has then emphasized the role of learning and 
knowledge accumulation in the East Asian success stories. Nelson and Pack (1999) point out 
that absorption of increasingly modern technology was instrumental in preventing a decline 
in the marginal product of capital. Differences in initial knowledge capital also explain why 
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the East Asian countries experienced a takeoff while others long stayed in a poverty trap. 
South Korea and Taiwan had notably created during their stage of import substitution an 
internal economic and social environment within which the national knowledge- 
accumulating process was encouraged (Bruton (1998)). 
In general, there is a substantial amount of evidence that underlines the importance of 
international technology diffusion for growth and development. Keller (2001) discusses this 
concept from the point of view of recent work on endogenous technological change. In this 
literature, convergence in income turns on the degree of international technology diffusion: 
because most developing countries spend relatively less on basic science and innovations, 
they rely even more on f oreign sources of productivity growth than richer countries do. 
According to Keller (2001), the relative importance of foreign technology in Less Developed 
Countries (LDCs) is at least 90%, and probably higher. In consequence, the greater 
importance of technology adoption from abroad suggests that learning spillovers might be 
particularly important for developing countries. Recent empirical investigations confirm that 
the relative contribution of international technology diffusion to domestic productivity 
growth is inversely correlated with economic size and the level of development (Coe and alii 
(1997), Meyer (2001)). 
Our paper explores this approach in the standard model of new economic geography 
developed by Krugman and Venables (1995). The new economic geography literature seems 
to offer a useful way of thinking about development. First, the analysis of economic 
integration has recognized the major contribution of spatial factors. Meanwhile, a country’s 
capacity to attract industrial activity is increasingly considered as a crucial element of the 
economic development process. By taking into account the location effect of international 
integration, the new economic geography literature models economic development as the 
spread of industry from country to country. Second, interaction between the new economic 
geography and theories of development stems from the observation that underdevelopment is 
nothing but the expression of industrial clustering in a few locations (Krugman (1995)). For 
this reason, part of the economic geography models focus on how economic policies may 
change the core-periphery pattern. Given the influence of this spatial framework in the 
debate on development, the economic geography literature may be useful in widening the 
range of policy options available to the LDCs. By changing the country attractiveness as a 
base for manufacturing production, economic planners can trigger industrial development. 
The two next sections develop the model and focus on a core-periphery structure 
where industrial production is concentrated in one country. Section IV analyses the role of 
trade policy in promoting industrialization. Section V provides a discussion on the location 
effects of international technology diffusion and formalizes the “developmental” role of the 
State. 
 
II. The Model 
 
Our model is closely related to that of Puga and Venables (1999). Consider a 
two-country world economy: each country has two sectors (agriculture and industry) and is 
endowed with given quantities of labor and arable land ( respectively  i L  and  i T ). Both 
factors are internationally immobile and labor is perfectly mobile between sectors: thus, RIEBER AND TRAN: TECHNOLOGY DIFFUSION, NORTH-SOUTH SPILLOVERS 
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wage differentials between countries emerge and the spatial dynamics will be provided by 
firm location. 
The agricultural sector is perfectly competitive and produces a homogenous output, 
chosen as the  numeraire and assumed costlessly tradable. Its production function is 
Cobb-Douglas in land and labor and has constant returns to scale. If manufacturing 
employment in country  i  is denoted  i m  and the labor market clears, agricultural output is 
given by the expression  ( )
( ) a a - -
1
i i i T m L  and the wage in the economy is written as: 
 
( )
( ) a a a
- - - =
1 ) 1 (
i i i i T m L w .                                                (1) 
 
The industrial sector consists of monopolistically competitive firms producing differentiated 
goods under increasing returns to scale. The presence of intermediate goods in an imperfect 
competition context generates forward and backward linkages between firms: each firm 
produces a variety of industrial good which is both used as inputs by other firms and sold as 
final goods to consumers. As in Krugman and Venables (1995), we work with a single 
aggregate manufacturing sector that uses its own output as input. The cost function of an 
industrial firm in location  i  is given by: 
 
( ) ( ) m m b e i i i i i q w X CT
- + =
1 ,                                               (2) 
 
where  i X  denotes output,  i e  is a fixed cost at the origin of increasing returns to scale and 
b  is the quantity of input requirements per unit of output. The input used by industry is a 
Cobb-Douglas composite of labor and an aggregate of the differentiated industrial goods 
priced  i w  and  i q , with the respective shares  ) 1 ( m -  and  m. 
The presence of learning and knowledge spillovers implies a decline in the fixed cost 
element, as the industrial sector expands: 
 
( )
















e .                 (3) 
 
i n  denotes the number of firms operating in country  i  and is endogenously determined by 
free entry and exit;  i q  is therefore the share of industrial firms in country  i . Equation (3) 
holds the assumption that industrial firm in location  i  learns (i.e., accumulates a stock of 
“knowledge capital” that reduces costs) from manufacturing production both in country  i  
and abroad. Following Baldwin and alii (1998), we assume partially localized technological 
externalities, i.e.,  1 0 < < i l . Indeed, recent empirical studies indicate that learning spillovers 
are neither perfect nor nonexistent, implying that international borders seem to dampen the 
externalities. As the development of foreign industrial sector is weighted by a parameter  i l  
strictly lower than one, the latter measures country  i ’s ability to assimilate technological 
knowledge from abroad and will be called the degree of technology diffusion. The higher its 
value, the more a country absorbs learning spillover effects of cum ulative production in the JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
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rest of the world. Due to their partial localization, technological externalities are a centripetal 
force: having more industrial firms in a location reduces the fixed cost, raising profitability 
of existing firms and stimulating in turn entry of new firms. This centripetal force has a 
magnitude inversely proportional to the parameter  i l : the higher the degree of technology 
diffusion, the less intensive foreign industrial development will play as centripetal force. 
Varieties of industrial goods are aggregated in a CES composite good used both as a 
consumption good and an intermediate input. The price index of this industrial composite in 
country  i  takes the following form: 
 
( ) ( ) [ ] j i    , p   t   n p n q j i j i i i „ + =
- - - s s s t
1
1
) 1 ( ) 1 ( ,                                  (4) 
 
where  i p   is the producer price of an individual variety and  1 > s  the elasticity of 
substitution between varieties. Real trade costs for the industrial goods take Samuelson’s 
“iceberg” form:  ) 1 (> t  units have to be shipped so that one unit arrives in the other region.
1 
An ad valorem tariff  1 - i t ) 1 ( > i t  is levied on industrial goods exported from  j  to  i  and 
produces some fiscal revenue. Hence, an industrial good produced in country  j  will be 
sold at price  j p  on the home market and at price  j ip t t  on the export market  i . 
Consumers have Cobb-Douglas preferences over the consumption of the agricultural 
good and that of the composite industrial good, denoted by  a C  and  m C  respectively: 
 
g g
m a C C U
) 1 ( - = ,                                                        (5) 
 
where  g is the share of manufactures in consumer’s expenditure. All industrial varieties 
produced enter consumers’ utility function with the same constant elasticity of substitution 
with which they enter firms’ technology. 
Expenditures on industrial goods in country  i  can be derived from Equations (2) and 
(5): 
 
( ) [ ] i i i i i i i i i CT n   R T m L m w E m g
a a + + - + =
- ) 1 ( .                               (6) 
 
The first term on the right-hand side is the value of consumer expenditure. In the square 
brackets, consumer income is divided into three parts: wage income in manufacturing, 
income generated in agriculture and tariff revenue. For the moment, we work with the 
assumption that total tariff revenue is distributed to consumers in a lump-sum manner: this 
assumption will be discussed thereafter. It is also assumed that consumers spend a fraction 
g of their income on manufactures. The second term on the right-hand side is the derived 
demand for intermediates as firms spend a fraction  m of their costs on intermediate goods. 
 
1.  t is viewed as reflecting all costs of doing business abroad out of tariffs. These include transport or shipping 
costs, costs of providing after-sales services, difficulty of dealing with cultural and language differences. RIEBER AND TRAN: TECHNOLOGY DIFFUSION, NORTH-SOUTH SPILLOVERS 
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The demand faced by a firm in country  i , hence its output, is either domestic  ) ( i H  
or foreign  ) ( i F : 
 
i i i F H X + = .                                                        (7) 
 
We can derive the two components of  i X   by applying jointly Shephard’s lemma and Roy’s 
identity to Equations (2), (4) and (5): 
 
( ) ( )
1 - - =
s s
i i i i q E p H ,                                                   (8) 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
s s s t
- - - =
1 1
j j j i i t q E p F .                                              ( 9) 
 
Because every firm faces a price elasticity of demand  s , it marks up price over marginal 
cost by the factor  ( ) s s - 1 . By choosing units of measurement such that  ( ) s s b 1 - = , 
prices are set according to the condition: 
 
m m
i i i q w p
) 1 ( - = .                                                       (10) 
 









p - = i X   .                                                   (11) 
 
Firms enter and exit in response to short-run profit opportunities. One can define then  i X  
as the long-run level of output giving firms zero profits: 
 
i i X e s  = .                                                          (12) 
 
The industrial wage bill in country  i   is the fraction  ) 1 ( m -  of total costs: 
 
( ) i i i i CT n w m m - = 1 .                                                  (13) 
 
The value of tariff revenue in country  i  is written as: 
 
( )   ,    1 j j j i i F p n t R - = j i „ .                                             (14) 
 
III. The Agglomeration of Industry: A North-South Model 
 
This section applies the model suggested above to the analysis of development 
problems. The discussion focuses on a core-periphery equilibrium where industrial JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
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production is concentrated in one industrialized economy (i.e., the Northern country denoted 
N ) while the other economy (i.e., the Southern country denoted  S ) has no industrial sector. 
The following sections aim to determine possible economic policy to be applied by the South 
to get out of the poverty trap. For that purpose, we seek to understand the forces at work as 
well as the stability conditions of the North-South pattern. As usual, let us  consider 
profitability of potential firm relocation: if profit opportunities are negative, it is not 
profitable for a firm to relocate to the South, so the agglomeration equilibrium remains stable. 
Conversely, if profit opportunities are positive, they act as an incentive for relocation of 
production to the South. 
In order to focus on development policy issues, two additional assumptions must be 
made: first, the influence of the Northern trade policy is withdrawn from the model by 
assuming a straightforward free trade policy ( 1 = N t ). So, there is a single trade policy 
instrument: to simplify further, the Southern trade policy will be denoted  t tS = . Second, to 
abstract from traditional comparative advantage, we assume that  both countries have 
identical factor endowments:  S N, i    , A T L i i = " = = . We do not think that international 
differences in factors are unimportant but by this assumption, we seek to focus exclusively 
on the trade flows generated by the agglomeration forces and their influence on industrial 
location. 
At the initial equilibrium, there is no industry and manufacturing employment in the 
South ( 0 = S n  and  0 = S m ). Thus, the wage gap between the North and the South can be 


















N .                                                   (15) 
 
Total expenditure on manufactures is met by output from Northern firms. Since the 
manufacturing wage bill is a fraction  ) 1 ( m -  of the output value, we have, from (13): 
 
( )( ) S N N N E E w m + - = m 1 ,                                             (16) 
 
where manufacturing expenditure in each country is derived from (6): 
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1 ,                             (17a)
     
( ) S S R A E + =g .                                                     (17b) 
 
Expression (17b) captures the fact that manufacturing expenditure in the Southern economy 
is totally made of consumers’ expenditure and matches agricultural income and tariff 
revenue. 
At the initial equilibrium, the price indices of expression (4) are now reduced to: RIEBER AND TRAN: TECHNOLOGY DIFFUSION, NORTH-SOUTH SPILLOVERS 
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N N N p n q
) 1 ( 1 ) (
s - = ,                                                  (18a) 
 
t   p n q N S S t
s ) 1 ( 1 ) (
- = .                                                 (18b) 
 
The relations (9), (14) and (18b) enable us to derive tariff revenue in the Southern country: 
 
( ) S S E t R 1 - = .                                                      (19) 
 
From relations (7) to (9), (17a) and (17b), demand for the output of each firm in the North 
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To examine the stability of the agglomeration equilibrium, the profits of a potential entrant in 
the South are assessed by comparing  S X  with its long-run level. The output level 
corresponding to zero profit is derived from expressions (3) and (12): 
 






= .                                                        (21b) 
 





























.                                               (22) 
 
Substituting (20a), (21a) and (22) into expression (20b), the sales of a potential deviant 
locating in the South are expressed as: 
 
( )




































X .                     (23) 
 
This equation defines the edge of the region in which the Southern economy industrializes: if 
S S X X > , then profit opportunities are positive, suggesting firms’ entry in South. Conversely, JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
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when  S S X X < , entry in South is unprofitable, involving agglomeration of industry in 
North. 
In addition to technological externalities which act as a centripetal force, the 
magnitude of  S X  is determined by three other forces. The first one is the wage differential, 
a centrifugal force describing the cost attractiveness of the Southern country. The larger the 
wage gap between the North and the South (rise of  S N w w  in expression (23)), the higher 
S X , suggesting therefore a more likely take-off in the S outhern country. The two other 
forces capture the pecuniary externalities arising from the input-output linkages between 
industrial firms. An increase in the output of the downstream industry, by enlarging the 
market for the intermediates it uses, stimulates sales of the upstream industry. This demand 
or backward linkage is captured in expression (23) by the square bracket term. In turn, the 
development of the upstream industry leads to an improvement in intermediate good supply 
and consequent reduction in production costs of downstream industries. In expression (23), 
the cost or forward linkage is formalized by the term  ( )
sm t
- t . Both these forces, through a 
process of cumulative causation, are centripetal forces and encourage agglomeration. 
 
IV. Trade Policy and Industrialization 
 
The evolution of profit opportunities for a potential firm locating in the South is 
illustrated in a diagram  ) , ( t t . This representation allows us to focus on how the four forces 
at work determine industrial location and how trade policy may change this determination. 
Figure 1  is computed using solutions of (15) to (17b), (21b), (23) for various values of 
import tariff (t ). It draws for different degrees of technology diffusion ( S l ) a curve along 
which firms in South earn zero profits:  S S X l s = . Retaining the line  S l =  0,50 for our 
comments, it is checked that points for which  S S X l s >  are located below the line. This 
locus of points corresponds to the Southern take-off as it is profitable for a manufacturing 
firm to move to the developing country. The opposite holds for points located above the line. 
Several points may be made at this stage of the analysis. First, holding the Southern 
trade policy constant, movements along the vertical axis introduce a discussion on economic 
integration (Krugman and Venables (1995)). For a given value of  S l ,  t captures the 
forward and backward linkages that undermine take-off in the South. Indeed, since industry 
is concentrated in North, any potential entrant in South has to pay more for its intermediate 
inputs than do firms in the North: the extra-cost of intermediates is captured by trade costs 
and import tariff. Hence, high trade barriers raise the price of intermediates, reducing  S X  
and profit opportunities in the South. Moreover, by discouraging new entry, trade barriers 
reduce in turn demand for intermediates and profitability of a potential upstream industry. 
We have then a circular process in which the Southern economy stays in the poverty trap. A 
rise of  t  strengthens these forward and backward linkages (and the stability of the 
agglomeration equilibrium) while it has no effect on the wage differential, the single 
















Values of other parameters are:  1. A   , 8 . 0   , 8 . 0   , 5   , 6 . 0 = = = = = m g s a  
 
Figure 1   Trade Policy and Industrialization 
 
 
- When trade costs are high (i.e., a weak international integration), the positive pecuniary 
externalities created by interfirm linkages are very powerful compared to the wage effects, 
so that concentration of manufacturing in the North remains stable. 
- Inversely, low trade costs diminishes the importance of proximity. As the importance of 
being close to customers and suppliers declines with the reduction in trade costs, the wage 
gap becomes the major determinant of industrial location and may induce dispersion. 
- When t lies between these extremes, the situation is ambiguous: the equilibrium pattern 
of location is determined by the value of import tariff. 
 
Thus, for some intermediate position of economic integration, trade policy may be the 
key to Southern take-off. Starting from a position in which industry is clustered in the North, 
we can study how the Southern country may use its import tariff to attract industry, namely 
to change the relative strengths of the forces at work. In this particular model, trade policy is 
captured by the parameter  t . It affects the sales and profitability of a potential deviant 
locating in South through four channels: 
 
a) Import cost effect (
sm - t ). By making imported inputs more expensive, tariffs reduce  S X  
and the profitability of potential industry in the South. 
b)  Market protection effect (
1 - s t ). By protecting local firms from import competition, a 
higher  t  increases the sales and profitability of a potential entrant in the South. This 
effect captures the benefits of import substitution: the larger  t , the higher the proportion 
of Southern manufacturing expenditure ( S E ) spent on Southern firms.   JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
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On the other hand, given the assumed distribution of tariff revenue to consumers and 
devoted by a fraction  g to manufacturing expenditure, trade policy induces demand 
spillover effects both in the North and the South: 
c) Demand spillover effects in the South ( S E ). When  t  rises, tariff revenue increases and 
spurs consumer expenditure on manufactures in the South. In expression (23), the 
favorable effect on the profitability of a potential entrant in South may be verified with 
0 > ¶ ¶ S S E X . 
d) Demand spillover effects in the North ( N E ). Increased expenditure on manufactures in the 
South also benefits to the North by the purchase of intermediate inputs. According to 
expression (23):  0 < ¶ ¶ N S E X , implying that demand spillover effects in the North 
decrease short-run profitability of a potential firm located in the developing country. 
Whether trade policy can induce industrial relocation to the Southern country depends 
on the tension between these four effects. While the a) and d) effects point towards trade 
liberalization to promote takeoff, the other effects b) and c) work in the opposite direction. 
The U-shaped pattern in Figure 1 indicates that both policies, by influencing the balance 
between the four effects, may be effective in attracting industry. The originality of such a 
result, also developed in Puga and Venables (1999), is to go beyond the dichotomy between 
import substitution and outward-oriented policies usually referred to in the literature. 
 
Finally, Figure 1 illustrates the positive effects international technology diffusion may 
have on the take-off of developing countries: a higher  S l  shifts the curves upwards and 
enlarges the locus of points in which industrialization may take place. Indeed, an increased 
degree of technology diffusion offers better prospects for the Southern country to exploit 
international learning spillovers and raising industry profitability. Analytically, a higher  S l  
diminishes the long-run level of output (Equation (21b)) and raises the probability for which 
S S X X > . 
 
V. Assimilation of Technology and Industrialization 
 
According to the above discussion, any change in  S l  leads to some development 
opportunities stemming from technology spillovers, with strong international diffusion 
favoring take-off. There are big differences in the degree of success that countries have in 
adopting foreign technology. As emphasized in the theories of endogenous technical change, 
we view technology as technological knowledge (Aghion and Howitt (1998), Grossman and 
Helpman  (1991)). In this literature, two main determinants of successful technology 
diffusion have been emphasized: human capital and research and development. Both are 
associated with the notion of “absorptive capacity”, the idea that a firm or a country needs to 
have a certain type of skill in order to be able to successfully adopt foreign technology 
knowledge (Keller (1996)). 
The process of learning spillovers, particularly in the form of acquisition of tacit 
knowledge and inter-firm spillover effects of cumulated gross output, has influenced 
development theory (Bardhan (1995)). It provided strong arguments in favor of the support RIEBER AND TRAN: TECHNOLOGY DIFFUSION, NORTH-SOUTH SPILLOVERS 
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of the “infant” import-substitution industry and its temporary protection through trade 
barriers. Such policy helped local firms to absorb technological know-how and benefit from 
the learning effects of cumulative output. However, the principal reason for the failure of 
import substitution in Latin America was the non-emergence of the indigenous learning 
process which underlay technology assimilation (Bruton  (1998)). First, as government 
restrictions on economic activity generated distortions, import substitution strategy created 
an environment that discouraged learning accumulation and technological progress. Second, 
these distortions and consequent resource misallocation gave rise to rents of various forms. It 
was potentially more profitable for entrepreneurs to devote their time and resources to 
capture such lucrative rents rather than developing technological capabilities. 
As Lall (1996) noted, the absorption of an increasingly modern technology has been a 
critical component of the East Asian success stories. The basic feature of South Korea and 
Taiwan notably was to create an internal social and economic environment within which the 
national knowledge-accumulating process was encouraged. Such indigenous learning 
capabilities might be enhanced either through tacit knowledge, learning by doing, or 
scientific, technical and vocational training. 
By enlarging the prospects for the developing country to benefit from technological 
externalities provided by the North, science and engineering skills are important in 
facilitating technology diffusion. We set out to show that successful technology diffusion 
from abroad has to do with a threshold level of human capital. In our particular model, the 
parameter  S l  measures the South’s ability to learn from the North’s experience in industrial 
production; thus, one basic objective of the Southern government should be to rise  S l . The 
strength of the centripetal force characterizing technological externalities would therefore be 
weakened. Such a development policy may change the incentives for firms to locate in the 
country, generating a cumulative process of industrial development. We can illustrate the 
“developmental” role of the State by endogenizing the technology diffusion parameter 
according to the value of tariff revenue. We capture the process of learning in a very simple 
way, by assuming that the South devotes all its tariff revenue to improve the domestic 
capacity of technological assimilation: 
 
( )   1 0     and      1 0    , 0 R    with      
1
S S












,                (24) 
 
where W measures the effectiveness of tariff revenue allocation in terms of technological 
absorption. The higher  W, the more efficiently the developing country absorbs learning 
spillover effects of cumulated production in the rest of the world. 
Unsurprisingly, Figure 2 illustrates the previous results according to which import 
substitution promotes effectively industrialization in the South; however, trade liberalization 
no longer appears as an alternative policy. Indeed, given the assumption that tariff revenue is 
entirely devoted to finance the indigenous learning process, the latter is improved by raising 
import tariff with all its associated effects already described (market protection, demand 
spillover effects in the South). Better assimilation of international technology lowers the 

















Values of other parameters are:  1. A   , 8 . 0   , 8 . 0   , 5   , 6 . 0 = = = = = m g s a  
 
Figure 2   Technological Assimilation and Industrialization 
 
 
However, Figure 2 points out also that the success of import substitution is positively 
related to the effectiveness of tariff revenue allocation, as the curve shifts downwards when 
W decreases. Import substitution policy may be effective in attracting industry, provided that 
the State orientates effectively its budgetary resources to increase domestic capabilities of 
technology assimilation. The absence of indigenous learning process and an inefficient 
resource allocation, illustrated notably by rent-seeking phenomena, can offset the benefits 




With the growing analysis of the economic integration process and the emergence de 
facto of a spatial framework in recent literature, the new economic geography has given a 
whole new insight into development issues. The industrialization process is thought 
henceforth as the ability of the developing country to attract industrial activity. Given this 
assumption, part of the economic geography models stress the key role of development 
policies in determining the equilibrium pattern of location. By influencing the interplay of 
centripetal and centrifugal forces at work, governments may change the incentives for firms 
to locate in the developing countries. 
In this paper, the analysis has focused on development opportunities provided by 
international trade and technology diffusion. The results suggest that the international 
dimension of technological knowledge is of key importance for the LDCs. In this context, 
technological protectionism from the North or, in the same manner, geographic localization 
of international technology diffusion, may have detrimental consequences for them. Relying RIEBER AND TRAN: TECHNOLOGY DIFFUSION, NORTH-SOUTH SPILLOVERS 
  37
on a model of economic geography, we first rule out the dichotomic approach of import 
substitution and trade liberalization by concluding that the two policies, through different 
mechanisms, may be both successful in getting the developing country out of the poverty 
trap. This result captures the tension between centripetal and centrifugal forces at work in our 
model: the former arises due to input-output linkages between firms and learning spillovers 
which create an incentive for manufacturing agglomeration, while the latter is provided by 
wage differentials. A discussion on the location effects of international technology diffusion 
has stressed the major contribution of learning and knowledge accumulation to takeoff. We 
show that strong international technology diffusion changes the attractiveness of countries 
for manufacturing production and can trigger industrial development. Given this result, one 
objective of economic planners should be to enhance the learning process that underlies 
technology absorption. By financing such a process, trade protection enhances the South’s 
ability to learn from the North’s experience in industrial production. However, this result is 
strongly conditioned to the effectiveness of resource allocation: import substitution policy 
may be effective in attracting industry, provided that the government orientates effectively its 
budgetary resources to increase the country’s absorptive capacity of technology assimilation. 
The absence of an indigenous learning process and an inefficient resource allocation, 
illustrated notably by rent-seeking phenomena, offset the benefits from trade protection. 
Our model has illustrated most of the major stylized facts of East Asian development. 
On the one hand, w e stand in favor of the “assimilation” theories (as opposed to the 
“accumulation” theories) which insist on the learning process as an explanatory factor of the 
rapid industrialization in East Asia. Knowledge accumulation by means of scientific and 
technical education, the development of new sets of skills or a growing number of well 
trained managers, engineers and applied scientists facilitated industrialization through the 
efficient absorption of modern technology (Nelson and Pack (1999)). On the other hand, we 
set out the view that the discussion about trade orientation is a false problem: as Bruton 
(1998) suggests, the basic question is the development of a strong indigenous learning 
process. During their import-substitution stage, South Korea and Taiwan had successfully 
created an internal economic and social environment within which the national knowledge- 
accumulating process was encouraged. By avoiding the traditional negative effects of trade 
protection (budgetary resource misallocation, rent-seeking activities), these countries have 
induced a reconsideration of import substitution policies. 
Then, if the difference does not lie in the mere gap between export orientation and 
import substitution, why is it commonly advised to LDCs to implement an outward-oriented 
development? There is evidence that the relative importance of the international technology 
diffusion has been increasing with the level of economic integration in the world. However, 
the evidence is not strong enough yet to provide support for export orientation as the best 
way to boost indigenous learning process. Using data from Colombia, Mexico and Morocco, 
Clerides and alii (1998) focus on technology diffusion related to exports: their paper does not 
offer strong evidence for domestic learning through exporting. By the same token, the 
development experiences of the ASEAN-4 countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines 
and Thailand) suggest that simply exporting is not sufficient to result in or to substitute for 
the creation of an indigenous learning process (Tran  (2001)). Concentration of their 
production and exports on some manufactured goods at the upper and lower ends of the skill JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
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and technology range illustrates a largely dual structure, in consequence of insufficient 
technological and supply linkages between the export sectors and the domestic economy. In 
particular, the obvious predominance of high-technology exports in Malaysia, the Philippines 
and Thailand results less from local technological capacities than from a growing division of 
labour within vertically integrated multinational firms. The dependence on foreign 
investment in the ASEAN-4 countries has resulted in favorable growth rates, but it questions 
whether this foreign investment is leading to strong indigenous learning capacity by national 
firms. Technological knowledge spillovers appear therefore to be resulting from a deliberate 
commitment to learning: the implicit assumption that simply changing the structure of an 
economy by means of outward orientation would also change its capacity to accumulate 
knowledge is evidently incorrect. Development of an indigenous absorptive capacity is a 
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